mercredi 18 avril 2018

Chemical attacks in Syria: 2017 UN report

"Khan Shaykhun 37. Using the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission as a starting point, the Mechanism conducted a comprehensive investigation into the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The Mechanism interviewed 17 witnesses in addition to those interviewed by the Fact-Finding Mission and collected and reviewed material not obtained by the Fact-Finding Mission. The Mechanism obtained substantial information on activities of the Syrian Arab Air Force on 4 April 2017. 38. The Mechanism examined eight possible scenarios regarding how the incident had occurred. On the basis of the information obtained, the following two scenarios were further investigated: (a) sarin had been released through an aerial bomb; or (b) sarin had been released through the explosion of an improvised explosive device placed on the ground. A third scenario with two alternatives was also investigated, neither of which was found to be linked to the release of sarin. 39. The Mechanism determined that sarin had been released from the location of a crater in the northern part of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017. 40. On the basis of their review of photographs, videos and satellite images, the forensic institutes and individual experts engaged by the Mechanism determined that the crater had most likely been caused by a heavy object travelling at high velocity, such as an aerial bomb with a small explosive charge. Examining the munition remnants observed inside the crater, the institutes and experts concluded that the remnants were pieces of a thin-walled munition from 300 to 500 mm in diameter and were likely from an aerial bomb. 41. The Mechanism also examined whether an improvised explosive device could have caused the crater. While that possibility could not be completely ruled out, the experts determined that that scenario was less likely, because an improvised explosive device would have caused more damage to the surroundings than had been observed at the scene. Furthermore, no witnesses had reported the placement or explosion of an improvised explosive device from the ground. 42. The Mechanism received information about the operation of Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft in the area of Khan Shaykhun indicating that such aircraft may have been in a position to launch aerial bombs in the vicinity. At the same time, however, Syrian Arab Air Force flight records and other records provided by the Syrian Arab Republic make no mention of Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. Furthermore, a representative of the Syrian Arab Air Force stated to the Mechanism that no Syrian Arab Air Force aircraft had attacked Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. 43. The Mechanism received conflicting information about the deployment of aircraft in Khan Shaykhun that morning. On 6 and 13 April 2017, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had made public statements that the Syrian Arab Air Force had bombed Khan Shaykhun with conventional bombs at approximately 1130 to 1200 hours. Furthermore, the Mechanism obtained original video footage from two separate witnesses that showed four plumes caused by explosives across Khan Shaykhun. The footage was confirmed by forensic analysis to be authentic and to have been filmed in Khan Shaykhun between 0642 and 0652 hours on 4 April 2017. 44. The Mechanism examined the nature of the rescue and health-care operations following the mass casualty situation caused by the release of sarin in Khan Shaykhun. At present, the Mechanism cannot verify the total number of persons who either died or were injured as a result of the attack, but concludes, on the basis of its interviews with victims and medical personnel, its review of medical records and its consultations with medical experts whom it has engaged, that the response to the incident largely correlated to the reported number of casualties and victims. 45. The Mechanism commissioned an in-depth laboratory study of the origin of the precursor chemical methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) used to produce the binary sarin released in Khan Shaykhun. The study revealed that the sarin had most likely been made with the precursor DF from the original stock from the Syrian Arab Republic. An initial screening of reports concerning previous incidents of the release of sarin in the Syrian Arab Republic showed that some “marker chemicals” appeared to be present in environmental samples. This would warrant further study. This finding relates only to the origin of the DF used as a precursor, not to those responsible for the dissemination of sarin. 46. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following: (a) Aircraft dropped munitions over Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017; (b) An aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic was in the immediate vicinit y of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017; (c) The crater from which the sarin emanated was created on the morning of 4 April 2017; (d) The crater was caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity; (e) A large number of people were affected by sarin between 0630 and 0700 hours on the morning of 4 April 2017; (f) The number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April 2017, and the fact that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the cr ater 10 days after the incident, indicate that a large amount of sarin was likely released, which is consistent with its being dispersed through a chemical aerial bomb; (g) The symptoms of victims and their medical treatment, as well as the scale of the incident, are consistent with a large-scale intoxication of sarin; (h) The sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Shaykhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic; (i) The irregularities described in annex II are not of such a nature as to call into question the aforementioned findings. On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in annex II."

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1734930.pdf 


"VIII. Concluding remarks 72. The Leadership Panel is deeply concerned by the finding of the Fact-Finding Mission that chemical weapons — sulfur mustard and sarin — were used. The Panel expresses its shock and dismay at the existence and use of these weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and its deep sympathy to those affected by them. The Pan el encourages the international community not only to make united efforts to ensure that such use will not be repeated, but also to provide assistance to those affected. 73. The continuing use of chemical weapons, including by non-State actors, is deeply disturbing. If such use, notwithstanding its prohibition by the international community, is not stopped now, a lack of consequences will surely encourage others to follow, not only in the Syrian Arab Republic, but also elsewhere. This is the time to bring these acts to an end. 74. The Leadership Panel wishes to give recognition to the professionalism, dedication and sacrifice of its staff, and to express its deep appreciation for all their work and commitment during the reporting period. 75. The Leadership Panel extends its appreciation for the support received from the United Nations Secretariat, in particular the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and from OPCW, which provided invaluable technical and logistical support to the Mechanism."

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1734930.pdf



French report from the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères

Les preuves s'accumulent et pour fabriquer de telles armes il faut des process industriels et des sites importants.


https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/170425_-_evaluation_nationale_-_anglais_-_final_cle0dbf47-1.pdf

TOS

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=637082509971836&id=100010102776424

Psychoanalysis provoked a huge damage in France: is autism one of them?

https://theconversation.com/frances-autism-problem-and-its-roots-in-psychoanalysis-94210

mercredi 11 avril 2018

A propos d’une erreur de compréhension du constructivisme social

https://www.causeur.fr/peggy-sastre-balance-porc-feminisme-150453


Non les gauchistes ne veulent pas revenir à l’homme originel!
Ils veulent déconstruire l’homme actuel pour construire le docile à rationalité limitée sans sexe trans genre ne se reproduisant qu’en éprouvette et en décroissance

L’obsession égalitariste et l’imposture bourdieusienne



Pierre Bourdieu : "Le musée est important pour ceux qui y vont dans la mesure où il leur permet de se distinguer de ceux qui n'y vont pas"

mardi 10 avril 2018

Plus on s'acharne sur l'exercice à l'acte moins il y a de praticiens, et plus on s'époumone sur les déserts médicaux...

https://www.fredericbizard.com/tarifs-des-dentistes-le-remake-du-scenario-2012-des-medecins-est-en-marche/

Je préfère parler d'exercice à l'acte tarifé exclusif.
Cet acharnement fiscal, réglementaire et tarifaire va éteindre les vocations.

Ce qui surprend c'est la docilité des praticiens dentistes et médecins. Celle des médecins est la plus étonnante car à la différence des dentistes ils n'ont pas d'actes hors sécu...

Les régimes spéciaux eux ont leur sécu (mines, SNCF...) et leurs médecins et biologistes salariés. Je ne sais pas s'il y a des dentistes à la SNCF.

Useful

https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/4/15929484/chronic-back-pain-treatment-mainstream-vs-alternative

Off-label drugs

https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/features/off-label-drug-use-what-you-need-to-know#1

Against the leftists' doomsayers

https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-better-than-it-looks-review-why-things-are-looking-up-1519772143?mod=djemMER
 
Paperblog